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CAN THE “HOT TUB” ENHANCE JURORS’
UNDERSTANDING AND USE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY?
Edie Greene and Natalie Gordon *
I. Introduction
The presence and prominence of expert testimony has grown markedly in
recent years as matters of increasing complexity have come before the courts.
As a result, lay jurors must try to understand and apply the oft-complicated
information provided by expert witnesses. But, are they willing and able to do
so? The increased complexity of trial evidence also raises questions about whether
traditional, adversarial trial procedures, in which experts often reach markedly
different opinions about the same set of facts and testify at different points during
the trial, allow for full comprehension and rational judgments.
This article will focus on how jurors understand and apply expert testimony
as presented during adversarial trial proceedings and how those proceedings pose
challenges for them. It will also explore the possibility that both understanding
and application can be enhanced if the presentation and structure of expert
testimony is changed. Part II of this article will describe the extent of experts’
“reach,” focusing particularly on experts who testify about scientific and technical
matters.1 This section details the frequency with which these experts testify in
trials in the United States and the types of trials in which they are involved.2
We adopt the framework used by social psychologists to capture the elements of
persuasion inherent in expert testimony, including attention to the communicator
(the expert witness), message (the testimony itself ), and audience (jurors and

* Department of Psychology, 1420 Austin Bluffs Parkway, Colorado Springs, CO 80918.
Email: egreene@uccs.edu or ngordon3@uccs.edu.
1

See infra Part II.

2

See infra Part II.
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juries).3 Part III will evaluate what psychologists and other social scientists have
learned about laypeople’s use of expert testimony.4 On the one hand, there is
reason for cautious optimism given jurors’ relatively careful scrutiny of experts’
information and objectives.5 On the other hand, jurors experience difficulties
in understanding and using probabilistic and statistical expert evidence.6 Part
IV introduces a novel concept regarding the presentation of expert testimony,
namely hot tubbing, also referred to as concurrent evidence presentation.7 In
this process, expert witnesses with differing positions reconcile some of those
differences out-of-court and then testify concurrently, or immediately after one
another, about ongoing disagreements.8 This procedure is primarily used in
administrative hearings and tribunals in Australia and New Zealand, and on rare
occasions during hearings in federal court in the United States.9 Hot tubbing
challenges the standard chronology of adversarial trial proceedings.10 It confers
various putative advantages, but also raises some concerns.11 Part V covers some
practical considerations associated with concurrent evidence presentation.12 On
balance, we believe that hot tubbing will enhance jurors’ understanding of expert
testimony and lead to more rational and predictable verdicts, particularly in cases
involving complex and probabilistic evidence.

II. How Often Do Expert Witnesses Testify and About What?
Although good data is exceedingly hard to come by,13 the few available sources
suggest that expert witnesses, particularly those conveying scientific and technical
evidence, play an increasingly important role in criminal and civil trials.14

3

See infra Part II.

4

See infra Part III.

5

See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.

6

See infra notes 111–16 and accompanying text.

7

See infra Part IV.

8

See infra Part IV.

9

See infra notes 165–70 and accompanying text.

10

See infra Part IV.A.

11

See infra Part IV.B.

12

See infra Part V.

See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1118 (1991) (stating
that “[t]here is next to nothing to be learned from published data on the use of experts in
American litigation.”).
13

14
See Deborah Connolly et al., Predicting Expert Social Science Testimony in Criminal
Prosecutions of Historic Child Sexual Abuse, 11 Legal & Criminological Psychol. 55, 55 (2006)
(“There has been a significant increase in the frequency of expert testimony over the past [twentyfive] years in Canada.” (citation omitted)); Hon. Geoffrey L. Davies, The Changing Face of Litigation,
6 J. Jud. Admin. 179, 188 (1997) (“Scientific and technical evidence has increased dramatically
[since the 1960s] both in its frequency and its complexity; and the difficulty of a trier of fact . . .
in understanding and consequently in assessing the reliability of such evidence, though not a new

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol16/iss2/6

2

Greene and Gordon: Can the “Hot Tub” Enhance Jurors’ Understanding and Use of Expert

2016

The “Hot Tub”

361

According to a recent commentary, diverse areas of science, including geology,
chemistry, physics, and biology, commonly factor into court proceedings.15 Thus,
judges and jurors must often evaluate expert scientific evidence in the process of
reaching verdicts.

A. Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases
In the criminal realm, expert witnesses tend to be involved in trials that feature
forensic evidence.16 Typically, this testimony—presented by both prosecution
and defense experts—addresses the questions of whether, and by what means,
defendants could have committed crimes. Defense counsels are increasingly likely
to introduce expert testimony on defendants’ biological predispositions to negate
the presumption that their behavior was voluntary.17
Expert testimony in criminal cases was not always common. For example,
in their study of criminal jury trials conducted throughout the United States in
the 1950s, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel determined that experts testified in
only one in four cases.18 An in-depth analysis of 201 criminal cases tried by juries
in Marion County, Indiana between January 1974 and June 1976 noted that
experts testified in only approximately one-third of cases, and two or more experts
testified in a mere 5% of trials.19 Experts who did testify focused on matters such
as the results of polygraph tests, fingerprint and ballistics analyses, and defendants’
capacity to stand trial.20 However, conviction rates in these cases showed that
most jury verdicts did not depend on them.21
The studies noted above were conducted prior to the significant advances in
forensic sciences and other technologies of the past few decades. But even by the
1980s, expert testimony was becoming more common in both state and federal

problem, has now become a critical one.”); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that “science-related issues have increased in number.”).
See Megan Yarnall, Dueling Scientific Experts: Is Australia’s Hot Tub Method a Viable
Solution for the American Judiciary?, 88 Or. L. Rev. 311, 313 (2009) (“Criminal trials relying on
forensic evidence, claims brought under the Endangered Species Act, toxic tort litigation, hazardous
waste cleanup disputes, and other proceedings almost always involve expert testimony from at least
one scientific discipline.”).
15

16

See id.

See Nita A. Farahany & William Bernet, Behavioural Genetics in Criminal Cases: Past,
Present and Future, 2 Genomics Soc. Pol’y 79, 79 (2006).
17

18
See Harry Kalven Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 139–40 (1966). These experts
were typically medical doctors called by the prosecution.

Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 Law &
Soc’y Rev. 781, 786–87 (1979).
19

20

Id. at 787.

21

Id. at 795.
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jurisdictions.22 Today, criminal proceedings often include expert testimony,23 and
the nature of that testimony is varied and sophisticated.24 Experts in criminal trials
testify about medical and biological processes,25 physical properties of evidence,26
and psychological issues,27 among others.
Still, data on the frequency of expert testimony is sparse: The most recent
analysis we were able to find was a survey of state prosecutors from 2,281 offices
across the country about the types of evidence they used in felony trials in 1994.28
Results showed that prosecutors employed expert witnesses in 83% of criminal
trials.29 Expert testimony was more commonly used by prosecutors in offices

22
See Irving Younger, A Practical Approach to the Use of Expert Testimony, 31 Clev. St. L. Rev.
1, 1 (1982) (“With ever increasing frequency, trials in the state and federal courts, civil and criminal,
tort and otherwise, turn upon expert witnesses. It is fair to say that it is impossible for a lawyer to
proceed with any confidence these days unless that lawyer has a very good grasp of the considerable
body of law that has been developed with respect to expert witnesses.”).
23
See Sonja K. Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony:
Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 441, 443 (2003) (“Compared to
jurors from the 1950s, jurors today face more scientific and technical evidence presented through
expert testimony.”).
24

See infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Olaf H. Drummer & Dimitri Gerostamoulos, Forensic Drug Analysis (2013)
(alcohol and drug intoxication testing); Edwin E. Steussy et al., Microbial Forensics: The Biggest
Thing Since DNA?, 51 Crim. L. Bull. 726 (forthcoming 2015) (analysis of bodily fluids such
as blood, semen, and saliva); Daniel Albert et al., Ensuring Appropriate Expert Testimony in Cases
Involving the “Shaken Baby”, 308 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 39 (2012) (cause of death).
25

See, e.g., Fred E. Inbau, Firearms Identifications—Ballistics, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
1293 (1999) (firearms and bullet identification); Chris Lennard et al., Forensic Application of
Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy for the Discrimination of Questioned Documents, 254 Forensic
Sci. Int’l. 68 (2015) (neutron activation analysis of questioned documents); Harry Hollien et
al., Issues in Forensic Voice, 28 J. Voice 170 (2014) (spectrographic voice identification and voice
stress analysis).
26

See, e.g., Amanda White et al., Fitness to Stand Trial: Views of Criminal Lawyers and Forensic
Mental Health Experts Regarding the Role of Neuropsychological Assessment, 22 Psychiatry, Psychol.,
& L. 880 (2015) (defendants’ capacity to stand trial); Kristy A. Matire & Richard I. Kemp, Can
Experts Help Jurors to Evaluate Eyewitness Evidence? A Review of Eyewitness Expert Effects, 16 Legal
& Criminological Psychol. 24 (2011) (reliability of eyewitness testimony); Evelyn Maeder &
Emily Pica, Secondary Confessions: The Influence (or Lack Thereof ) of Incentive Size and Scientific
Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Perceptions of Informant Testimony, 38 Law & Hum. Behav. 560 (2014)
(reliability of confessions); Margaret B. Kovera & Eugene Borgida, Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Trials: The Admissibility of Psychological Science, 11 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 105
(1997) (behavior of abused children); Fiona E. Raitt & Suzanne Zeedyk, The Implicit Relation
of Psychology and Law: Women and Syndrome Evidence (2000) (responses of sexual assault
victims); Brenda Russell et al., Expert Testimony of the Battered Person Syndrome, Defendant Gender,
and Sexual Orientation in a Case of Duress: Evaluating Legal Decisions, 27 J. Fam. Violence 659
(2012) (characteristics of battered women).
27

28
See Carol J. DeFrances et al., Prosecutors in State Courts, 1994, Bureau
Bull., Oct. 1996, at 1–2, https://perma.cc/4LQJ-BT4Y.
29

of

Just. Stats.

Id. at 4.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol16/iss2/6

4

Greene and Gordon: Can the “Hot Tub” Enhance Jurors’ Understanding and Use of Expert

2016

The “Hot Tub”

363

serving jurisdictions with populations of 500,000 or more than by prosecutors
who served part-time.30 Prosecutors also reported how often defense attorneys
called expert witnesses in these trials; the survey found defense-retained experts
were less common than prosecution-retained experts and provided testimony in
only 66% of trials overall.31

B. Expert Testimony in Civil Cases
Other studies have examined the prevalence of expert testimony in civil trials.
Samuel Gross provided data from 529 civil trials that ended in jury verdicts in
the California State Superior Courts in 1985 and 1986.32 Experts testified in
86% of these trials, with an average of 3.3 experts per trial, underscoring Gross’s
contention that “[w]hole categories of cases are dominated by issues that can only
be resolved with expert knowledge.”33 Multiple experts was the norm, with most
trials involving between two and five.34 Experts were approximately twice as likely
to be called by the plaintiff as by the defendant.35 Nearly all (95%) personal injury
and wrongful death trials, which comprised 70% of the sample, involved expert
testimony, at an average rate of 3.8 expert witnesses per trial.36 Not surprisingly,
given the nature of the cases, half of the experts in the dataset were medical
doctors and an additional 9% were other medical and clinical professionals
such as rehabilitation therapists, psychologists, and dentists.37 There were fewer
product liability trials in the sample, but all of them involved expert testimony,
with an average of 4.7 experts per trial, including engineers, scientists, and
authorities in other technical fields.38 Professionals with expertise in business and
finance and in accident reconstruction and investigation testified less often, in
11% and 8% of the trials respectively.39 In nearly 75% of the trials, jurors were
confronted with experts called by both sides, with the experts testifying on the
same general topic in two-thirds of these trials.40 Thus, jurors were often forced

Id. (Prosecutors in offices serving jurisdictions with populations of 500,000 or more used
expert testimony in 99% of cases, whereas, part-time prosecutors used expert testimony in 68% of
cases. This difference is probably accounted for by the fact that prosecutors in larger jurisdictions
handle both a higher volume and more complicated kinds of cases.).
30

31
Id. (including 98% of trials in large jurisdictions and only 50% of trials in jurisdictions
with a part-time prosecutor).
32

See Gross, supra note 13, at 1119.

33

Id. at 1116.

34

Id. at 1119.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id. (most commonly, these were medical experts).
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to resolve disputes between opposing experts by evaluating their conflicting
conclusions about the evidence.
Additional data reflecting the prevalence of expert testimony in civil trials
comes from a 1998 study of judges’ experiences with expert witnesses in 297
federal cases.41 Judges responded to a series of questions about their most recent
civil trial in which expert testimony was admitted and their general impressions
of the expert testimony in those cases.42 Findings showed that experts were
most likely to testify in tort cases, primarily those involving personal injury or
medical malpractice.43 In terms of the nature of their expertise, the most common
testifying expert was someone in a medical or mental health field.44 These experts
were typically asked to opine on the existence, nature, extent, and cause of injuries
or damage.45 Expert economists also testified frequently, reflecting the fact that
these experts are often called to calculate and forecast the present and future
economic losses claimed by plaintiffs in civil lawsuits.46 Engineers and other
safety and process experts, as well as experts in business, law, and finance, testified
in a smaller number of trials.47 Their expertise addressed product design and
testing, industry standards, and the standard of care owed by professionals, among
other things.48

C. Expert Testimony as Persuasive Communication
At its core, expert testimony is intended to persuade. Factfinders evaluate
various aspects of expert testimony, including the credibility of its source and
the consistency of the arguments, to gauge how much weight to give it. One can
understand the notion of expert testimony as persuasion by examining it within
a framework of persuasive communications developed by psychologists at Yale
University in the early 1950s.49 In their influential book, Communication and
Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change, Carl Hovland, Irving Janis,
and Howard Kelley posited that three factors are important in persuasive speech:
(1) the source, (2) the nature of the persuasive message, and (3) the audience.50

See Molly T. Johnson et al., Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials a Preliminary Analysis,
Fed. Jud. Ctr., 3 (2000), https://perma.cc/4ZG9-A87K.
41

42

Id. at 1.

43

Id. at 2.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 4.

46

Id. at 2.

47

Id.

48

Id.

See Carl I. Hovland et al., Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of
Opinion Change 13–14 (1953).
49

50

See id.
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In practical terms, the source—the expert witness—is persuasive to the extent
that he or she is credible, trustworthy, and dynamic.51 The message—the expert
testimony—is persuasive if it is structured, organized, and presented in ways that
facilitate opinion change.52 The audience—judges and jurors—will be persuaded
if they attend to, understand, and accept the persuasive message.53 Variables related
to the expert, the message, and the audience influence the persuasive impact of an
expert’s testimony.
A source’s credibility stems from his or her expertise, including training,
experience, knowledge, and competence.54 These are the factors that judges
consider when determining the admissibility of expert testimony and, all other
things being equal, sources with greater credibility are deemed to be more
persuasive than those with less.55 However, over time people tend to forget exactly
who said what, so although they may not be persuaded immediately upon hearing
a non-credible source, they may become more persuaded by that person’s message
with the passage of time.56
Other components of credibility include trustworthiness and dynamism.57
An argument made by a trustworthy source is more likely to be accepted than one
made by an untrustworthy source.58 Similarly, an argument made by a physically
attractive59 and powerful 60 speaker will have a more persuasive punch than an
argument made by a person who lacks these features.

See Carl I. Hovland & Walter Weiss, The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication
Effectiveness, 15 Pub. Opinion Q. 635, 642 (1951).
51

See Carl I. Hovland & Henry A. Pritzker, Extent of Opinion Change as a Function of Amount
of Change Advocated, 54 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 257, 260 (1957).
52

53
See Carl Hovland & Wallace Mandell, An Experimental Comparison of Conclusion-Drawing
by the Communicator and by the Audience, 47 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 581, 587 (1952).
54
See, e.g., Hovland & Weiss, supra note 51, at 13–14; Zakary Tormala et al., Multiple Roles
of Source Credibility Under High Elaboration: It’s All in the Timing, 25 Soc. Cognition 536 (2007).
55
See Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20 Law
& Hum. Behav. 379, 388 (1996).

This phenomenon is known as the “sleeper effect.” See G. Tarcan Kumkale & Dolores
Albarracin, The Sleeper Effect in Persuasion: A Meta-Analytic Review, 130 Psychol. Bull. 143,
165 (2004).
56

57
See Hovland & Weiss, supra note 51, at 642. Trustworthiness includes honesty and
objectivity, and dynamism includes charisma, attractiveness, and style of delivery.

See Joseph R. Priester & Richard E. Petty, The Influence of Spokesperson Trustworthiness on
Message Elaboration, Attitude Strength, and Advertising Effectiveness, 13 J. Consumer Psychol. 408,
418 (2003).
58

59
See Elizabeth A. LeVan, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom: Attorney Beware, 8
Law & Psychol. Rev. 83 (1984).

See Bonnie Erickson et al., Speech Style and Impression Formation in a Court Setting: The
Effects of “Powerful” and “Powerless” Speech, 14 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 266 (1978).
60
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Whether the message itself—for our purposes, the expert’s testimony—is
persuasive is also influenced by a number of factors including: the message’s
complexity,61 the extent to which other experts agree with the message,62 whether it
contains counterarguments,63 whether it is presented in a narrative or fragmented
style,64 and whether the message is presented at the beginning, middle, or end
of a sequence of information.65 In general, opinions or messages presented in
the middle of a sequence are less persuasive than opinions or messages presented
earlier or later in the set.66 Consistent with this finding, when two messages
concern the same topic—as is often the case with expert testimony—the first will
be more persuasive than the second if there is a delay between the second message
and recipients’ use of the information, a concept known as the primacy effect.67
On the other hand, the second message will be more persuasive than the first if it
comes immediately before recipients need to use the information conveyed in the
messages; this is called the recency effect.68
The third constellation of persuasion-relevant variables focus on the recipient
of a persuasive message.69 A variety of factors related to the recipient influence the
extent to which a message is persuasive.70 Two factors, in particular, are relevant
to jurors’ receptiveness to expert testimony regarding scientific or technical
evidence.71 High-level reasoning skills enhance the likelihood that a persuasive
communication can be analyzed and its message can be deemed informative.72
These reasoning skills can be taught, suggesting that even complex expert testimony
can be persuasive if it incorporates an educative component.73 Recipients’

61

See Cooper et al., supra note 55.

See Margaret B. Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects of Juror Gender
and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Environment Case, 84 J. Applied Psychol.
362 (1999).
62

See William McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some Contemporary Approaches, in
1 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1964).
63

See Stanley L. Brodsky, Testifying
Witness (2d ed. 2013).
64

in

Court: Guidelines

and

Maxims

for the

Expert

See Richard E. Petty et al., Motivation to Think and Order Effects in Persuasion: The
Moderating Role of Chunking, 27 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 332, 341 (2001).
65

66

Id.

67

Id. at 332.

68

Id.

See generally Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training of Reasoning: Formal
Discipline and Thinking about Everyday-Life Events, 43 Am. Psychologist 431, 431–33 (1988).
69

70

See id.

See id.; John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, The Need for Cognition, 42 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 116, 116–17 (1982).
71

72

See Lehman et al., supra note 69, at 431–33.

See Geoffrey Fong et al., The Effects of Statistical Training on Thinking about Everyday
Problems, 18 Cognitive Psychol. 253, 278 (1986).
73
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motivation to expend effort to understand expert testimony also plays a role.74 This
variable, known as the need for cognition, is a relatively stable personality factor.75
It distinguishes people who tend to seek out, think about, and use information
to understand the world—people with a high need for cognition—from those
who tend to rely on less cognitively taxing ways of gleaning information—people
with a low need for cognition.76 Mock juror studies have shown that the former
have a greater ability than the latter to incorporate complex expert evidence into
their judgments.77
In recent years, psychologists and other observers of juries have also
examined juror decision-making according to information-processing models of
persuasion.78 Two models have been especially influential: the heuristic-systematic
model (HSM)79 and the elaboration likelihood model (ELM).80 According to
these models, jurors who engage in careful scrutiny of the content and quality of a
message are using systematic (according to HMS)81 or central (according to ELM)
processing.82 They will attend to and endorse a persuasive argument if it contains
high-quality, valid arguments.83 By contrast, jurors who rely on mental shortcuts
or surface-level analysis are using heuristic (according to HMS)84 or peripheral
(according to ELM) processing.85 They focus less on the quality and content of
the message and more on cues such as the number of arguments made and the
expertise or likeability of the source of the message.86
A significant concern about some types of expert testimony—particularly
testimony regarding science and statistics—is that jurors may lack the ability
74

See Cacioppo & Petty, supra note 71, at 116–17.

75

Id. at 119.

76

Id. at 128.

See Saul M. Kassin et al., Juror Interpretations of Ambiguous Evidence: The Need for Cognition,
Presentation Order, and Persuasion, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 43, 51 (1990); Bradley D. McAuliff
& Margaret B. Kovera, Juror Need for Cognition and Sensitivity to Methodological Flaws in Expert
Evidence, 38 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 385, 400 (2008).
77

78
See Bradley McAuliff et al., Juror Decision-making in the Twenty-first Century: Confronting
Science and Technology in Court, in Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts 303 (David
Carson & Ray Bull eds., 2d ed. 2003).
79
See Shelley Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source
Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 752, 762 (1980).
80
See Richard Petty & John Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 123, 125 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986) (providing
the elaboration likelihood model).
81

See Chaiken, supra note 79, at 752.

82

Id.; see Petty & Cacioppo, supra note 80, at 175.

83

See Chaiken, supra note 79, at 752; Petty & Cacioppo, supra note 80, at 138.

84

See Chaiken, supra note 79, at 753.

85

See id.; Petty & Cacioppo, supra note 80, at 125.

86

See Chaiken, supra note 79, at 753; Petty & Cacioppo, supra note 80, at 186.
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or motivation to engage in the effortful, systematic processing required for
comprehension. Instead, they may rely on peripheral cues unrelated to the
quality or consistency of the experts’ arguments.87 In Part IV we consider whether
hot tubbing, in which experts present evidence concurrently, can enhance the
likelihood of systematic processing by lay jurors.88

III. How Laypeople Evaluate Expert Testimony
A. Jurors Are Aware of the Possibility of Adversarial Bias in
Expert Testimony
Over the years, various jury observers, including federal judges, have
claimed that jurors will be mesmerized by the presumed infallibility of expert
witnesses.89 The concern has been that because jurors lack relevant knowledge
and sophistication, they are unable to carefully scrutinize experts’ assumptions
and conclusions, and thus, are overly deferential to experts’ opinions.90 However,
studies have found that jurors’ evaluations of expert testimony are actually quite
careful 91 and even skeptical and critical.92 The studies indicate that jurors are fully
aware of the adversarial nature of expert testimony93 and that they assume experts
are biased in favor of the side that called them.94
As part of their empirical analysis of the use of expert witnesses, Daniel
Schuman, Elizabeth Whitaker, and Anthony Champagne interviewed jurors in
a large sample of cases in Seattle, Baltimore, and Tucson, and found no evidence
of blind deference to experts’ positions.95 Rather, jurors said they carefully
scrutinized expert witnesses on the basis of the logic and rationality of their

87

See Kovera et al., supra note 62.

88

See infra Part IV.

See Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40
Ariz. L. Rev. 849, 849–51 (1998) [hereinafter The Performance of the American Civil Jury]; Neil
Vidmar, Expert Evidence, the Adversary System, and the Jury, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health 137, 137 (2005)
(stating, “a jury . . . would likely be even less equipped than the judge to make reliability and
relevance determinations and more likely than the judge to be awestruck by the expert’s mystique.”
(citation omitted)).
89

90

See The Performance of the American Civil Jury, supra note 89, at 849.

See Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences:
Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 Law & Soc’y Rev. 513 (1992).
91

See id.; Daniel Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the
Courts—Part II: A Three City Study, 34 Jurimetrics 193, 203, 206 (1994).
92

See Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, The Effect of Blinded Experts on Jurors’
Verdicts, 9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 765, 767 (2012).
93

94
See id.; Nicholas Scurich et al., Venire Jurors’ Perceptions of Adversarial Allegiance, 21
Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 161, 163 (2015).
95

Shuman et al., supra note 92, at 197.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol16/iss2/6

10

Greene and Gordon: Can the “Hot Tub” Enhance Jurors’ Understanding and Use of Expert

2016

The “Hot Tub”

369

testimony, and their partiality and professionalism.96 Evidence confirming this
conclusion comes from a study by Neil Vidmar that involved in-depth interviews
with jurors in five medical malpractice cases.97 Jurors in the study were able to
identify and articulate motives underlying experts’ testimony, including allegiance
to the side that paid their fees and a desire to validate the actions of professionals
in their fields.98 Finally, by questioning 269 jurors who decided cases involving
business and corporate defendants, Sonya Ivkovich and Valerie Hans found that
jurors spent considerable time evaluating the completeness and consistency of
experts’ analyses, and were unlikely to accept experts’ conclusions that lacked
those ingredients.99
Additional support for the notion that jurors are neither over-awed by
experts, nor blithely accepting of their conclusions, derives from experimental
studies that used mock jury methodology to vary the nature and type of expert
evidence.100 A recent example demonstrated that mock jurors are readily attuned
to the adversarial nature of expert testimony.101 In the study, researchers varied
whether the results of structured risk assessment instruments designed to allow
mental health experts to reach conclusions about sexual predators were conveyed
by court-appointed experts or by partisan experts.102 The researchers found that
mock jurors deemed the former more objective, credible, and persuasive than
the latter.103 In deciding whether to commit the sexually violent predator, jurors
discounted input from the partisan experts but relied on input from the courtappointed experts.104 Jurors appeared to adjust their evaluations of the experts’
testimony as a function of those experts’ presumed biases.
Further support comes from a mock jury study involving a staged medical
malpractice trial that included testimony of two medical experts, one of whom
was a “blind expert,” and the other expert had been hired by a party in the case.105
After hearing the evidence, jurors assessed the defendant’s negligence, awarded

96

Id. at 200–01.

See Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury: Confronting the
Myths About Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets, and Outrageous Damage Awards 131– 60
(1st ed. 1997).
97

98

See id. at 158, 171, 173.

99

See Ivkovic & Hans, supra note 23, at 469.

100

See Scurich et al., supra note 94, at 163.

101

Id. at 166.

102

Id. at 164.

103

Id. at 166.

104

Id.

See Robertson & Yokum, supra note 93, at 765–70 (a “blind expert” is a qualified
professional who reviewed the case materials without knowing which side had requested his or
her opinion).
105
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damages, and also gauged the experts’ credibility.106 The study suggested that
jurors were aware of the possibility of expert bias because they deemed the blind
expert significantly more credible and persuasive than the adversarial expert.107
Taken together, these findings suggest that jurors are able and willing to
analyze experts’ conclusions with the adversarial nature of trials in mind, and they
are not unthinkingly impressed by experts’ knowledge and professional standing.
Whether recognition of experts’ partisan interests in a case is sufficient to enable
jurors to comprehend the essence of their testimony—the nature, objectivity,
thoroughness of their analyses, and the reasonableness of their conclusions—is
an open question. Some critics claim that it is insufficient, reasoning that in the
context of traditional trial practices, jurors are constrained from analyzing experts’
conclusions objectively and rationally.108 This is especially concerning when jurors
are required to understand and apply experts’ conclusions regarding probabilistic
or statistical evidence.109

B. Jurors Have Difficulty Comprehending and Applying Probabilistic
Expert Evidence
By its very nature, expert testimony often deals with concepts and issues that
are beyond the knowledge and experience of most laypeople. Jurors are especially
challenged by complex probabilistic and statistical evidence at the core of nearly
all scientific enterprises,110 citing it as particularly difficult to understand.111
Studies of laypersons’ reasoning skills provide one explanation as to why this is
a difficult undertaking for jurors: Even when people understand how to reason
inferentially, they have difficulty applying that understanding to unfamiliar
tasks and domains.112 As a result, they tend to underutilize expert probabilistic
evidence relative to Bayesian norms that assign a prior probability to a particular

106

See id. at 771–74 (damages were only awarded where appropriate).

107

See id. at 783.

108

See id. at 766– 67.

109

See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Shari S. Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, 1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci.
255 (2005); Jane Goodman, Jurors’ Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16
Am. J. Trial Advoc. 361 (1992); David Kaye et al., Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond
to Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 797 (2007); Jonathan J.
Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability (RMP) in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?,
35 Jurimetrics 201 (1995); Jason Schklar & Shari S. Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence:
Errors and Expectancies, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 159 (1999); Gary Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence
of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?, 62 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 739 (1992).
110

111
See Joseph S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury
Trials, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 727, 728–29 (1991).

See, e.g., Lehman et al., supra note 69, at 431–33; Richard E. Nisbett et al., Teaching
Reasoning, 238 Sci. 625 (1987).
112
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hypothesis and then update as new information becomes available.113 Furthermore,
they are reluctant to base their verdicts on statistical evidence alone.114 Laypeople
are especially unlikely to use probabilistic evidence if they can rely on salient,
anecdotal information instead.115 An understanding of statistical evidence is
essential to fact-finding and decision-making in many trials because scientific
evidence, and its underlying statistics, is increasingly ubiquitous in both the
criminal and civil realms.116
Probabilistic evidence factors into civil trials involving trademark
infringement, antitrust, race and gender discrimination in employment, and
causes of injuries and losses in tort lawsuits, among others.117 For example, an
expert epidemiologist may draw conclusions and testify about the development
of a particular disease or birth defect and its association with exposure to certain
environmental or chemical agents. As another example, testimony from an expert
economist or actuary is likely to be a part of nearly all personal injury trials, as
these professionals will present probabilistic evidence about the monetary value—
both past and future—of various losses and injuries. They do this by making a
variety of probabilistic assumptions about lost income, medical and rehabilitative
costs, inflation, interest rates, etc.118
Another common form of probabilistic evidence comes from forensic analysts
who, in controlled laboratory settings, conduct analyses of evidence collected at
the scene of a crime and report their conclusions to the court or to the attorneys
requesting their assistance. At trial, forensic analysts describe the procedures by
which the evidence was gathered, stored, and tested, as well as their conclusions
about the degree of association between test results and the actions or identity of

See Goodman, supra note 110; David Kaye & Jonathan Koehler, Can Jurors Understand
Probabilistic Evidence?, 154 J. Royal Stat. Soc’y 75, 75–77 (1991); Schklar & Diamond, supra
note 110.
113

See Keith Niedermeier et al., Jurors’ Use of Naked Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases
and Implications of the Wells Effect, 76 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 533 (1999); Wells, supra
note 110.
114

See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 Psychol. Rev.
237 (1973); Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Who Uses Base Rates and P(D/~H)? An Analysis
of Individual Differences, 26 Memory & Cognition 161 (1998). In a jury context, see, Brian H.
Bornstein, The Impact of Different Types of Expert Scientific Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Liability
Verdicts, 10 Psychol. Crime & L. 429, 429–31 (2004).
115

See, e.g., David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of
Expert Testimony (2010); Jonathan Koehler, Misconceptions about Statistics and Statistical Evidence,
in Handbook of Trial Consulting 121, 121 (Richard L. Wiener & Brian H. Bornstein eds., 2011)
(describing a 56% increase in the use of the terms “statistic” or “statistical” in the Federal Cases
database from 1990 to 2004).
116

117

See Faigman et al., supra note 116.

See generally Edie Greene & Brian H. Bornstein, Determining Damages: The
Psychology of Jury Awards (2003).
118
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the alleged perpetrator. These evaluations are typically expressed as estimates of
probabilities or likelihoods.
One form of forensic evidence, DNA evidence, was first introduced in
criminal trials in the 1980s.119 Its usage grew rapidly, and approximately twothirds of state court judges who responded to a national survey conducted in the
late 1990s indicated that it had been presented as evidence in their courtrooms.120
By its very nature, DNA evidence also involves judgments of probability.121
A growing body of research has examined jurors’ abilities to use probability
estimates associated with DNA evidence.122 These studies assess how laypeople
evaluate the presence of a “match” between DNA samples taken from a defendant
and a crime scene.123 Though some data suggests that mock jurors collectively are
capable of understanding DNA testing procedures and error rates, and weighing
DNA evidence in accordance with its diagnosticity, not all mock jurors have
these abilities.124 A typical layperson tends to attribute less weight to statistical
information concerning a DNA match than would be prescribed by probability
theory alone.125 Furthermore, he or she is relatively insensitive to statistical
testimony that describes potential sources of error and are more persuaded by
statistical evidence that ignores those risks.126
Variations in how DNA evidence is framed and presented also affect how
jurors interpret and use the evidence. For example, DNA match statistics described
as probabilities (e.g., “[t]he probability that the suspect would match the blood
specimen if he were not the source is 0.1%”) are more persuasive than evidence

See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, 309 Sci. 892, 894 (2005).
119

See Sophia L. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 Law & Hum. Behav. 433, 441–51 (2001).
120

121
Scientists compare suspects’ DNA with crime scene DNA evidence and, using databases
that provide the frequency of particular alleles (one member of a pair of genes located on a particular
position on a chromosome), determine the probability of random matches across different reference
populations (e.g., races, ethnicities). See Saks & Koehler, supra note 119, at 893.
122

See infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.

123

See infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.

See Suzanne O. Kaasa et al., Statistical Inference and Forensic Evidence: Evaluating a
Bullet Lead Match, 31 Law & Hum. Behav. 433 (2007); Kaye et al., supra note 110; William
C. Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic Statistics: Evaluation of Random
Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal Equivalents, 39 Law & Hum. Behav. 332 (2015).
124

125
See, e.g., Kaasa et al., supra note 124, at 14; Jonathan J. Koehler, When are People Persuaded
by DNA Match Statistics?, 25 Law & Hum. Behav. 493, 509 (2001); Schklar & Diamond, supra
note 110, at 178.

See Jonathan J. Koehler, If the Shoe Fits They Might Acquit: The Value of Forensic Science
Testimony, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 21, 39 (2011) (potential sources for error include laboratory
error, coincidence, and being framed, among others).
126
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that describes a broad suspect population (e.g., all people in a large city) or that
incorporates frequencies (e.g., “one in one thousand people in Houston would
also match the blood drops”).127 As another example, forensic science evidence
conveyed using numerical formulations of uncertainty associated with likelihood
ratios yield more accurate fact-finding than the same evidence communicated
through verbal expressions.128
These studies suggest that the persuasiveness of expert evidence would be
enhanced by presentation formats that are consistent with laypeople’s preferences
and intuitive beliefs about statistical measurements and errors.129 More broadly,
expert testimony will be more persuasive to the extent that it is consistent with
jurors’ pre-existing knowledge and intuitions about a particular topic. But
frequently, experts’ analyses and conclusions are at odds with the common
knowledge and prior beliefs of many laypeople, particularly concerning matters
of science and technology.130
There are various reasons why some expert evidence is difficult for jurors to
understand; we comment briefly on three: (1) that many laypeople are uninformed
about, and lack intuition about, methodological issues in scientific testimony;
(2) that legal concepts conveyed by experts may be at odds with laypeople’s
knowledge and beliefs; and (3) that jurors have difficulty making sense of
conflicting opinions, particularly on topics about which they lack knowledge.131

1. Naivety About Scientific Methodology
Outside of the realm of legal decisions, statistical and methodological aspects
of science and technology pose reasoning difficulties for many people.132 For
example, laypeople tend to neglect base-rate information and fail to account for
small sample sizes when judging probabilities of particular events.133 They are not

127
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make DNA
Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1275, 1278 (2001).
128
See Kristy A. Matire et al., On the Interpretation of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science
Evidence: Presentation Formats and the Weak Evidence Effect, 240 Forensic Sci. Int’l. 61, 66 (2014).
Research participants read the summary of a burglary trial that included expert testimony given in
numerical, verbal, tabled, or visually scaled format. Id. Of these presentation methods, numerical
estimates yielded judgments that were most comparable to those intended by the expert. Id.
129

Id. at 67.

130

See id.

131

Thompson & Newman, supra note 124, at 15.

132

See id.

See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 115 (base-rate neglect); Fong et al., supra note 73, at
260– 61 (sample size neglect).
133
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sufficiently critical of methodologies that lack appropriate control groups and
they fail to recognize sample bias.134
In the context of juror and jury decision-making, Margaret Kovera and her
colleagues have found that laypeople acting as jurors have difficulty understanding
methodological aspects of scientific expert evidence.135 Specifically, mock jurors
are either insensitive or insufficiently sensitive to limitations and oversights in
scientific methods, even when those flaws are made apparent and explained to
them by expert witnesses.136 In one study, community mock jurors were exposed
to variations in the scientific rigor of research conveyed by an expert witness.137
Although the mock jurors were able to identify a missing control group as one
threat to internal validity, they failed to recognize others, including experimenter
bias and confounding variables.138
A more recent study suggests that jurors’ reasoning can be aided by effective
cross-examination but only if it is scientifically-informed.139 In this study, mock
jurors watched a simulated armed robbery trial in which an expert witness
testified about scholarly research on the reliability of eyewitness memory.140 When
the expert was cross-examined in a scientifically-informed way, jurors were made
aware of, and accounted for, the lack of a control group in the research the expert
had described.141 When the expert was questioned in a scientifically-naïve way,
they did not.142 Lacking scientifically-rigorous guidance from an expert, jurors
overlook methodological flaws in scientific research.

134
See Davina Mill et al., Influence of Research Methods and Statistics Courses on Everyday
Reasoning, Critical Abilities, and Belief in Unsubstantiated Phenomena, 26 Canadian J. Behav.
Sci. 246 (1994) (failure to account for control groups); Ruth Hamill et al., Insensitivity to Sample
Bias: Generalizing from Atypical Cases, 39 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 578 (1980) (failure to
recognize sample size).
135
See, e.g., Lora M. Levett & Margaret B. Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert
Witnesses for Educating Jurors About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 Law & Hum. Behav. 363, 370
(2007); McAuliff & Kovera, supra note 77, at 400.
136

See McAuliff & Kovera, supra note 77, at 400.

See Bradley D. McAuliff et al., Can Jurors Recognize Missing Control Groups, Confounds, and
Experimenter Bias In Psychological Science?, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 247, 249–52 (2009).
137

138

Id. at 253.

See Jacqueline L. Austin & Margaret B. Kovera, Cross-Examination Educates Jurors about
Missing Control Groups in Scientific Evidence, 21 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y, & L. 252, 258 (2015).
139

140

Id. at 254.

141

Id. at 261.

142

Id.
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2. Legal Concepts Are at Odds with Laypeople’s Common Knowledge
and Beliefs
It is well-established that even informed citizens have knowledge and beliefs
that are inconsistent with legal doctrine and policy.143 Expert testimony may
require jurors to contemplate matters at variance with their personal beliefs,
and even to consider conclusions and opinions that conflict strongly with their
common sense notions. This can explain why, on occasion, jurors fail to apply
expert testimony on issues about which they have some familiarity including
sexual and child abuse, domestic violence, mental states and insanity, police
investigations, and corporate policies and practices.
In his ground-breaking book, Commonsense Justice, Norman Finkel pointed
out that legal concepts such as self-defense, privacy, euthanasia, cruel and unusual
punishment, the mens rea associated with various crimes, and the insanity defense
may be at odds with laypeople’s notions of those concepts.144 As a result, trials in
which these issues arise often involve expert testimony that challenges laypeople’s
beliefs. Consider the law’s conceptions of defendants’ mental states—a topic
commonly addressed by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists who interview and
assess defendants and testify about their conclusions during trial.145 Researchers
have conducted experimental studies in which they varied the nature and extent
of psychiatric expert testimony to examine its impact on jurors’ judgments of
defendants.146 Results showed that jurors’ pre-existing beliefs about defendants’
mental states tended to trump their interpretation and use of the experts’
evidence,147 a result confirmed by interview data.148 Jurors who were interviewed
after serving in capital trials acknowledged that they ignored expert testimony
from mental health professionals when it challenged their prior beliefs about
abnormal thoughts and behaviors.149

143
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, The Insanity
Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense”, 10 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 1, 5
(2003); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 857 (1991); Vicki L. Smith & Christina A. Studebaker, What Do
You Expect? The Influence of People’s Prior Knowledge of Crime Categories on Fact-Finding, 20 Law &
Hum. Behav. 517, 517–18 (1996).
144

See Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice 319 (1995).

145

Id. at 329–34.

See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity,
8 Law & Hum. Behav. 81, 81– 85 (1984); Caton F. Roberts & Stephen L. Golding, The Social
Construction of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity, 15 Law & Hum. Behav. 349 (1991).
146

147

See Roberts & Golding, supra note 146, at 371.

See Roberts & Golding, supra note 146, at 371; Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic:
An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1109,
1139 (1997).
148

149

See Sundby, supra note 148, at 1134.
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In regard to statistical evidence presented in a courtroom, Jonathan Koehler
delineated a number of misconceptions that laypeople hold and suggested that
these misconceptions cause them to misweigh statistical evidence and render
unfair verdicts.150 He pointed out that laypeople assume that data from small
samples is not informative; that correlation implies causation; and that base
rates, or background probabilities of some event, are irrelevant to case-related
judgments.151 Also, studies of laypeople’s assessments of damage awards showed
that they were not naturally inclined to factor exponential growth into the
calculations, and that they often relied on the monetary figures provided by expert
witnesses or by the parties themselves in a process called “anchoring.”152

3. Trial Procedures Often Require Jurors to Make Sense of
Conflicting Opinions
The difficulties inherent in comprehending and applying expert testimony
are often exacerbated in situations which involve contradictory expert opinions
that force jurors to decide whom to believe.153 Although expert testimony offered
by adversaries is not inherently conflicting, it often is.154 This tends to occur
because experts rely on different assumptions and reach divergent conclusions
about the same set of data.155 As a result, jurors are often left adrift to sort out
the reasonableness and logic underlying the experts’ opinions on their own. This

150

Koehler, supra note 116, at 121–31.

151

Id.

See Jane Goodman et al., Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Mock Juror Strategies
in Awarding Damages, 29 Jurimetrics 285 (1989); Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The
Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 385, 386–87
(1990). Anchoring refers to a process in which an irrelevant or meaningless value provides a starting
point for a judgment and adjustments from the anchor are often insufficient. See Tarika DaftaryKapur & Melissa Cahoon, The Effects of Outcome Severity, Damage Amounts and Counterfactual
Thinking on Juror Punitive Damage Award Decision Making, 28 Am. J. Forensic Psychol. 21
(2010); Mollie W. Marti & Roselle L. Wissler, Be Careful What You Ask For: The Effect of Anchors
on Personal Injury Damages Awards, 6 J. Experimental Psychol. Applied 191 (2000); Bradley
D. McAuliff & Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are Not Created Equal: The Effects of Per Diem
Versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 164, 164–66
(2010); W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. Legal Stud. 313,
313–16 (2001).
152

153
See Neil Vidmar & Shari S. Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 1121,
1134 (2001).

See, e.g., Carol McKinley, James Holmes Trial Marked by Emotional Moments, Key Evidence,
ABC News (July 14, 2015, 4:32 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/10-notable-aspects-jamesholmes-trial/story?id=32388217 (all of the experts who testified in the 2015 trial of Aurora,
Colorado theater shooter, James Holmes, agreed that Holmes was suffering from schizophrenia at
the time of the shooting, though they diagnosed different forms of the illness).
154

See Daniel C. Murrie et al., Are Forensic Experts Biased by the Side that Retained Them?, 24
Psychol. Sci. 1889, 1890–92 (2013) (the partisan nature of adversary proceedings can push experts
to reach opinions consistent with the side that hired them).
155
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is particularly problematic when the expert testimony concerns statistical or
probabilistic evidence.156
Useful information comes from studies of jurors’ understanding and use
of conflicting expert testimony concerning damage awards. In an early effort,
Allan Raitz and his colleagues found that when mock jurors were confronted
with opposing expert testimony concerning compensatory damage awards
in a wrongful death case, they tended to simply endorse the plaintiff ’s or the
defendant’s figure—the anchoring phenomenon157—rather than using those
opinions as end points on a range of acceptable awards and selecting a figure
between them.158 Another study that found a lack of adjustment in awards
following expert testimony involved a simulated employment discrimination
case.159 Jurors’ compensatory damage awards were not significantly different
whether they heard testimony from only the plaintiff ’s expert or from both
the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s experts, suggesting that they paid little heed to
alternative interpretations.160
The nature of the experts’ testimony also influences jurors’ analysis of
conflicting opinions. Jurors in a simulated price-fixing case viewed an expert who
presented a statistical model of damages as having greater expertise than an expert
who presented a more concrete, “yardstick” model, but the former was also less
clear than the latter.161 Ultimately, that lack of clarity may have discouraged jurors
from accepting the expert’s conclusions.162 This finding suggests that jurors will
discount or ignore testimony that involves any complex statistical calculations
that lack clarity.

IV. A New Model For Expert Testimony: The Hot Tub Approach
In traditional trial proceedings, one party presents all of its evidence on all
relevant issues before the opposing party has an opportunity to provide alternative
viewpoints and contrasting evidence. This arrangement makes it difficult for factfinders to compare the two positions or even to recognize the issues upon which
156

See supra notes 111–31 and accompanying text.

See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974).
157

See Raitz et al., supra note 152, at 394. Conceivably, one expert’s figure may be more
appropriate than another’s, though the partisan nature of adversarial expert testimony suggests that
the “truth” will usually lie between. In the least, jurors should deliberate the merits of conflicting
perspectives, rather than simply endorse one opinion.
158

159
See Edie Greene et al., Juror Decisions about Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 17
Behav. Sci. & L. 107, 118 (1999).
160

Id. at 119.

161

See Diamond & Casper, supra note 91, at 542.

162

Id.
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the parties agree. Traditional trial procedures also make it particularly difficult for
jurors to compare the methods, procedures, and conclusions of opposing expert
witnesses whose testimony may be separated by days, weeks, or even months, and
who may have presented complicated statistical or probabilistic evidence.
One method of remedying these challenges is to allow experts to present
their evidence either concurrently, or one after another, from the witness
stand.163 Known as the “hot tub,” or as concurrent evidence presentation, this
novel approach is currently used by courts and tribunals throughout Australia,
particularly in New South Wales, and New Zealand.164 It has been formally adopted
by the Federal Court and Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia, and by the
Supreme Court and the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales.165 It
is used predominantly in civil cases—including medical litigation, patent cases,
and insurance cases—and, on occasion, in criminal cases.166 Importantly, in the
Australian system, experts give written pledges to not stake out clearly partisan
positions as advocates but to serve as functionaries of the court.167
The use of concurrent evidence presentation in the United States is very
limited, in part, perhaps, because it runs counter to the strict adversarial nature
of the American legal system in which experts are expected to show allegiance
to the side that retained them.168 The first reported example of concurrent
evidence presentation in the U.S. came from a voting rights case in the District of
Massachusetts in 2003 which involved two political scientists who testified about
statistical evidence of discrimination in a challenge to the legislature’s redistricting
plan.169 Since then, it has been used in a smattering of cases including breach of
contract, products liability, and patent infringement.170
163
See Rita Farrell, ‘Hot Tubbing’ Anthropological Evidence in Native Title Mediations, Nat’l
Native Title Tribunal (2007).

See Gary Edmond, Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in
Australian Civil Procedure, 72 Law & Contemp. Probs. 159, 166 (2009).
164

See Steven Rares, Using the “Hot tub”: How Concurrent Expert Evidence Aids Understanding
Issues, Fed. Ct. Australia n.20 (Oct. 12, 2013), https://perma.cc/SC7L-TKXV.
165

See Tina Cockburn & Bill Madden, Adapting to Concurrent Expert Evidence in Medical
Litigation, 22 J.L. & Med. 610, 610 (2015) (“Concurrent expert evidence is most well entrenched
in the civil disputes arena, where courts are required to determine private disputes such as medical
negligence claims . . . .”).
166

167
See John Emmerig et al., Room in American Courts for an Australian Hot Tub?, Jones Day
(Apr. 2013), https://perma.cc/82ZL-X36Z.
168

However, Australia also uses adversarial trial procedures.

See Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291 (D. Mass. 2004); see also
Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Black Political Task Force v. Galvin, No.
2002-11190 DPW (D. Mass. Nov. 14, 2003) (the hot tub method is described in the transcript of
the third day of the trial). For a description of the concurrent evidence presentation in Black Political
Task Force, see Lisa C. Wood, Experts in the Tub, 21 Antitrust 95 (2007).
169

170

See Emmerig et al., supra note 167.
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Importantly, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a framework that allows
for the practice, including the opportunity for courts to manage the presentation
of testimony and to question witnesses.171 For example, Rule 611 gives judges
“control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; [and]
(2) avoid wasting time . . . .” 172 Additionally, Rule 614 permits judges to call
and question witnesses.173 More broadly, Rule 102 grants flexibility in evidentiary
procedures.174 Rule 102 states, “[t]hese rules shall be construed so as to administer
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote
the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing
a just determination.”175

A. How the Process Works
Although variations exist,176 hot tubbing typically begins by having each party’s
expert prepare a written report, which the experts exchange prior to the hearing or
trial.177 Sometimes they confer in order to prepare a joint report about the topics
on which they agree and disagree, providing short explanations of the reasons for
their disagreements.178 Generally, this exercise reduces the extent of disagreement
to a few points and, with the dissension clarified, facilitates settlements.179 If a
case goes to trial, the experts testify together or directly after one another.180 Their
testimony usually occurs after both parties have presented their case-in-chiefs.181

See Scott Welch, From Witness Box to the Hot Tub: How the “Hot Tub” Approach to Expert
Witnesses Might Relax an American Finder of Fact, 5 J. Int’l. Com. L. & Tech. 155, 160–62 (2010).
171

172

Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)(1)–(2).

173

See Fed. R. Evid. 614(a)–(b).

174

See Fed. R. Evid. 102; see also Welch, supra note 171, at 162.

175

Fed. R. Evid. 102.

This is often the result of judicial discretion in implementing this procedure. See Wayne
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be allowed to provide opening statements. See Welch, supra note 171. In other courts the attorneys
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South Wales Experience (Feb 27, 2004), https://perma.cc/ZN47-5FDB [hereinafter The New South
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Thereafter, a rather informal process—compared with traditional trial
procedures—unfolds, in which the experts are asked by the judge to explain
the main issues of the case, and then to comment or ask questions of the other
expert.182 Only one expert speaks at a time, allowing them to have a respectful,
constructive dialogue.183 The lawyers and judge are also able to ask questions
during the discussion.184 This process is typically mediated by the judge and, as a
whole, represents the greatest departure from what occurs during a trial conducted
by the rules of the adversarial system.185
After the initial dialogue, more traditional questioning commences, as power
is returned to the attorneys who have the opportunity to cross-examine the
opposing sides’ experts.186 During this stage, the experts are able to question one
another and add to the other expert’s testimony.187 This entire process repeats
until all of the issues have been addressed sufficiently.

B. Putative Advantages and Disadvantages of the Hot Tub Procedure
A few commentaries posit various benefits and costs of the hot tub approach.188
The hot tub may represent a more efficient way to present expert testimony
because the experts can identify topics on which they agree and disagree early
in the process and then focus their presentations and discussions on the issues
that are most contentious or that lack consensus.189 These organized presentations
presumably reduce the time spent on cross-examination and overall trial time.190
In one of the first cases in which expert evidence was presented concurrently,
a hearing that was estimated to last six months was shortened to five weeks, a
difference attributed in part to the use of the hot tub approach.191 Reducing
the amount of information presented and the length of the trial also lessens the
cognitive load placed on judges and jurors and increases the likelihood of rational
decision-making.
Similarly, having experts testify together or sequentially reduces the amount
of information that must be remembered at any given time.192 This reduction
182
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See Coonawarra Penola Wine Indus. Ass’n Inc. v. Geographical Indications Comm. [2001]
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should enable judges, lawyers, and jurors to make more direct comparisons
between the positions staked out by the experts.193 Hot tubbing also reduces
the adversarial bias present in much expert testimony because it allows for
informal, open discussions that are less argumentative and confrontational than
traditional cross-examination.194 Rather than having the experts’ testimony
colored by the rhetorical skills of the attorneys, the experts’ opinions are expressed
in their own words.195
Concurrent evidence presentation may be especially useful as a mechanism
for conveying scientific or statistical information because it enables fact-finders
to observe a public peer review by other experts in the “tub.”196 This process
could help jurors understand the scientific methodologies and statistical analyses
that experts undertook and the scientific bases for their conclusions.197 Because
the experts must also answer questions put forth by the judge and attorneys,
fact-finders would have additional opportunities to enhance their understanding
of the issues and improve their comprehension of the evidence. Finally, having
the experts occupy the witness stand together and question one another could
enhance judgments of their credibility.198
However, concurrent evidence sessions also have some disadvantages. One
concern is that more experienced, confident, or assertive experts will dominate the
procedure and, as a result, win over the fact-finders.199 Similarly, experts may not
be well matched with respect to credentials or experience, and experts with more
of those attributes might prevail, regardless of the soundness of their opinions.200
Critics worry that attorneys will coach their experts on how to respond to
questions based on the opinions of the other party’s expert, even though it is just
as likely to occur in the traditional presentation of expert testimony.201 Another
concern is that experts will over-simplify the testimony about their analyses to
make their discussion more accessible to fact-finders.202 On the other hand, the
opposite concern has also been expressed; that experts might engage in such high-
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level discussions with one another that only those trained in the field will be able
to understand, leaving others out in the cold.203
Judges and attorneys have expressed various concerns about the ways that
concurrent evidence sessions will change their role in the courtroom. Judges are
concerned that hot tubbing would place additional managerial burdens on them,
and attorneys worry that it would remove their control of witness examination,
which might disrupt their planned trial strategies.204 Attorneys may prefer to
cover certain issues through traditional cross-examination rather than to have
their experts question the opponent’s expert on those topics. For some judges and
advocates, the change may simply be too radical of a departure from the known
procedures. There is also the obvious practical concern about how to fit more than
one or two experts on the witness stand together.205

C. Data On the Effectiveness of the Hot Tub Procedure
The limited data that exist on the effectiveness of the hot tub comes prima
rily from Australia. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) examined the
effectiveness of the hot tub approach through surveys administered to judges,
experts, and attorneys at the conclusion of certain cases.206 The purpose was to
determine general opinions of the procedure and thoughts on how it worked in a
particular case.207 Judges were also asked about the perceived impact of concurrent
evidence presentation.208 The majority of cases chosen for the procedure came
from the Compensation and Veterans’ Affairs jurisdictions, and most of the expert
testimony was from medical specialists.209
All of the judges who presided over trials involving a hot tub were satisfied—
and most were very satisfied—with the process.210 They reported that the hot
tub took either the same amount of time, or less time than the traditional

Henry Ergas, Reflections on Expert Economic Evidence, B. News 39 (2006-2007), https://
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See Edmond, supra note 164, at 176. In the hearing described by Wood, supra note 169, at
6, two experts were able to sit in a witness box in the federal courthouse in Boston because the box
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Id. at 15 (data were obtained from twenty-six tribunal members; eighteen members (69%)
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hearing or trial process.211 Further, judges said that the hot tub allowed experts
to provide opinions based on facts introduced into evidence rather than on notes
taken months earlier in consulting rooms, which facilitated comparisons of the
experts’ evidence.212 Judges also lauded the objectivity and quality of the experts’
testimony, which expedited the process of writing and handing down decisions.213
Overall, the judges thought the process simplified technical matters and distilled
the issues.214
The experts reported that concurrent evidence presentations allowed them to
expand on their opinions, whereas in traditional proceedings they are confined to
narrow “yes/no” responses.215 Those who participated in these sessions reported
that they liked the experience, citing the fact that it allowed them to communicate
their opinions directly to the judge and attorneys, and reduced the likelihood that
attorneys would misrepresent their opinions.216
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission issued a report on the
experience of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales that had
formally integrated concurrent evidence presentations into its proceedings.217 It
concluded that “the giving of concurrent evidence has very significant potential
advantages. Especially where there are more than two relevant experts, the process
can save time, [minimizing] the time spent on preliminaries and allowing the key
points to be quickly identified and discussed.”218 It also concluded “that rules of
court should facilitate the taking of concurrent expert evidence.”219 Even prior
to the AAT’s study, the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended that
“[p]rocedures to adduce expert evidence in a panel format should be encouraged
whenever appropriate.”220

V. Practical Matters
To our knowledge, hot tubbing has never been used in a jury trial in Australia
or elsewhere.221 In many respects, it is contrary to the partisan nature of adversarial
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trial procedures in jury trials.222 Therefore, various procedural and practical hurdles
would need to be surmounted before it could realistically become a feature in the
courtroom.223 Obviously, as a first step, both sides would need to agree to use the
procedure, and their trial strategies, including the particular expert witnesses they
enlist, may need to change.
Assuming the parties agree to employ the hot tub, then various issues
concerning trial management await the presiding judge. Jurors would need to be
instructed, early in the trial, about the novel manner in which expert testimony
is being presented because the procedure runs counter to their expectations of
partisanship. Mechanisms would need to be in place to ensure that experts refrain
from talking exclusively to each other and “above” their audience by using jargon
and concepts understood only by professionals. Whether and how jurors would
question expert witnesses, as is permitted in both criminal and civil trials in some
jurisdictions in the U.S., would need to be addressed, particularly if the experts
testify together.224 If these and other necessary modifications can be made, then
experts’ explanations of complex principles in a discussion-like forum could aid
jurors in resolving the parties’ disagreements.

VI. Conclusion
Others have speculated about the forums in which the hot tub offers
advantages over traditional expert testimony presentations.225 These include bench
trials and pretrial hearings and depositions.226 Arguably, the list could also include
mediations, settlement conferences, and administrative hearings. We believe that
concurrent evidence presentation could eventually play a pivotal role in jury trials
involving scientific or technical issues as well.
There are several reasons for our optimism. First, judges gave largely positive
assessments of the concurrent evidence presentations they experienced.227 Second,
For example, partisan experts do not confer in pretrial conferences or attempt to discern
areas of common ground prior to appearing in court. To the contrary, parties strive to guard their
trial strategies, including when possible, details of the evidence they anticipate expert witnesses
will provide.
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an additional burden on the court and reduce any efficiency provided by the hot tub approach,
the procedure is impractical for jury trials: “[T]here is simply not enough room in the hot tub
for the entire jury.” Id. at 337. But judges already have an obligation to manage juror questioning
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dealing with this aspect of jury trials. See generally id.
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because jurors have less education, knowledge, and sophistication with complex
issues than judges, they have more to gain from the reduced partisanship associated
with the hot tub approach. Third, jurors have particular difficulty understanding
and using probabilistic evidence commonly associated with scientific expert
testimony.228 Thus, procedures that reduce the amount of information conveyed
by experts, the complexity of their theories, and the uncertainty associated with
all scientific disciplines, should enhance jurors’ decision-making.
In short, if hot tubbing can enhance judges’ understanding of complex issues,
it may have a greater benefit for lay jurors. Although the hot tub approach is
probably not appropriate or necessary for all trials involving expert witnesses, it
could be invaluable in certain circumstances, particularly in trials that are lengthy,
complex, or especially contentious. It is our hope that a bold judge somewhere
in the U.S. will give hot tubbing a try, and that the experience will be a positive
one. If so, we encourage judges to incorporate hot tubbing into jury trials in the
U.S. and elsewhere. As the hot tub approach becomes more common, data on its
strengths and weaknesses will emerge, allowing for a better understanding of its
potential to aid factfinders in civil and criminal cases.
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